ALTERNATIVES FOR THE GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES OF THE SUSTAINABLE WASTE MANAGEMENT IN HUNGARY by Bartus, Gábor
PERIODICA POLYTECHNICA SER. SOC. MAN. SCI. VOL. 13, NO. 2, PP. 181–192 (2005)
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES OF
THE SUSTAINABLE WASTE MANAGEMENT IN HUNGARY
Gábor BARTUS
Department of Environmental Economics
Budapest University of Technology and Economics
H–1521 Budapest, Hungary
Phone: (36 1) 463 4029, Fax: (36 1) 463 1149
e-mail: bartus.gabor@makk.zpok.hu
Received: Sept. 12, 2005
Abstract
The most fashionable political slogan of present environmental protection is without doubt sustain-
ability and sustainable development. There cannot be any international agreement, European Union
policy or Hungarian act without mentioning or referring to the principle of sustainability. Science at
the same time is trying to fill this notion with a theoretical and practical content with all available
instruments, in order to be able to provide a designable and measurable professional background
for environmental policy planning, implementation of regulatory instruments and the monitoring of
human activity. The present article is looking for the answer to the question by analysing mostly Hun-
garian but partly European waste management regulation, what kind of so far not exploited regulation
opportunities are available in order to realize a sustainable waste management practice.
Keywords: sustainability, waste management, governmental policies, waste tax.
1. The Interpretation of Sustainability in the Field of Waste Management
Although it is not the direct purpose of the present paper to give a precise and final
definition for sustainability (to close the debate about this topic), naturally it is still
necessary to define the notion – at least as a working hypothesis – in order to assess
the efficiency of governmental interventions from the aspect of sustainability.
In the common sense, waste management is the treatment of solid or possibly
liquid by-products and used products of consumption and production, without caus-
ing environmental damages. In wider sense, however, waste management cannot
be separated from other elements of the material converting activity of the econ-
omy. Fig. 1 shows the simplified scheme of the material converting activity of the
economy.
Fig. 1 shows, among others that the distinction of waste from other by-
products (air and water pollution, noise) is rather arbitrary, but apparently serves
the administrative efficiency of legal and scientific work. It can also be seen in the
figure that besides the problems related to returning waste and other pollutants to
the environment there is another confrontation point of the economy-environment
relation, namely the exploitation of natural resources (shrinkage of stocks and the
often extensive pollution caused by the exploitation).
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Fig. 1. Material Flow Scheme of Human Activities
It can be a major conclusion that although usually only the lower left-hand
corner of the figure is considered as waste management (waste management = what
should be done with used products), it can be necessary to intervene at any point of
the material conversion chain in order to solve waste management problems effi-
ciently. Governments accordingly usually apply regulations or economic incentives
that concern the waste already produced. Technological specifications of landfills
or waste burning plants or regulation (obligatory recycling ratio) and incentives
(product fee) of recycling belong to this type of regulatory instruments for instance.
We can find less instruments that try to intervene at early stages of the material
usage chain (e.g. natural resource extraction taxes).
We suggest using the following sustainability criteria that are only hypotheses
and not proved in the framework of this article because of space limitations:
1. The optimal (that is sustainable) level of waste generation is the quantity of
waste, for which it is true that the marginal cost of waste management equals
marginal cost of waste generation prevention, if both marginal costs include
all external costs.
2. The optimal (that is sustainable) rate of possible waste management tech-
niques (recycling, burning, landfill) is determined by considering which type
of management technique has a minimal marginal cost in case of different
Qi waste quantity units if external costs are also included.
We consider a waste management system sustainable if both of these criteria
are fulfilled at the same time.
2. Alternative Opportunities to Support the Realization of Sustainable
Waste Management
With the help of the logic demonstrated in Fig. 1 it is easy to categorize the possible
measures of waste management to achieve social optimum (see Table 1) by the
point of intervention on the material use chain.
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Table 1. Waste management regulatory measures
Point of intervention: Regulatory measures (examples):
Natural resource exploitation
(mining, logging etc.)
Resource tax (rent)
Quality control of exploitation (quota system)
Conversion of raw materials into
products (production)
Best Available Techniques (BAT)
Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC)
Waste Tax / Advanced Disposal Fee (ADF)
Recycling
Product Charge
Subvention of investment in recycling
Mandatory Recycling Targets
Waste burning
Emission norms
Burning Tax
Landfill
Quality Standards
Landfill Tax
Direct regulations are dominant for waste management planning and regu-
lation in Europe and also in Hungary. In case of hazardous waste there is only
direct regulation while there are more and more economic instruments in the case
of non-hazardous waste management regulation.
Economic measures are also applied in Central Eastern European countries.
The most common measures are naturally user fees, those instruments that make
the waste producers pay the cost of waste collection, transport and disposal. Some
countries apply deposit on beverage containers and products fees on e.g. batteries
and accumulators.
Theoretical research (PALMER and WALLS, [13]; FULLERTON and KINNA-
MAN, [8]) shows that input-side regulation is appropriate to set the optimal share
of primary and recycled raw materials in case of a given output or waste quantity,
but these measures are not useful to optimize the quantity of waste. The optimal
level of waste generation can only be obtained by a policy that combines the above-
mentioned measures with product taxes (product fees) or subsidy (subvention of
environmentally friendly products). In most cases the common application of prod-
uct taxes and the subvention of recycling is the most advantageous solution. The
common application of product taxes and tax allowance of investment in recycling
and the taxation of primary raw materials are also suggestible. The regulation of
recycling rates with norms is considered to be the less effective solutions. Subven-
tion is furthermore especially reasonable where there is a danger of illegal waste
deposal because of low willingness to pay.
In spite of this, as a consequence of the EU directive on packaging and pack-
aging waste, the recycling rate regulation has become widespread and obligatory
in EU member states including Hungary.
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It is apparent that the contradiction between the recommendations about reg-
ulatory forms considered optimal by scientists and actual regulatory practices im-
plemented by governments is becoming more and more obvious. Consequently, as
inefficient regulation will not result optimal waste management practice (or only
accidentally), there will be a contradiction between stated political aims of govern-
ments and actual results of governmental arrangements, too. The development of
a sustainable waste management system is therefore hindered by governments as
well (among several other factors).
3. Opportunities of a Possible Alternative: the Implementation of Waste Tax
in Hungary
We investigate in the present article whether there is a realistic alternative of sub-
optimal regulatory measures. We analyse the implementation possibilities of a
Pigovian tax on the basis of the landfill tax applied in several countries but it would
also be imposed on wastes disposed of in waste burning plants. The basis of the
discussed tax would be the quantity of by-products not prevented or recycled and
used products (waste) not considering whether it is disposed of in landfills or through
burning. (The rate of tax naturally could – or in order to reach the optimal solution
should – depend on the way of disposal.)
3.1. European Experience of Landfill Tax
Landfill tax has become a more and more widely used measure in Western Europe.
In 2001–2002 nine (old) EU member states applied landfill tax, with a total of 1.7
billion EUR income. It is a good indication of the development that while in 1990
only two countries applied landfill tax, it was introduced in seven further countries
between 1992 and 2000 (EEA, [7]).
The implementation was explained by several motives: intent to motivate the
reduction of waste flow to landfills, the promotion of prevention and recycling, the
consideration of external costs of landfill and the generation of additional incomes
for the budget. The latest assessments have found that the effect of landfill tax on the
quantity of household solid waste is quite questionable, landfill taxes still function
as price indicators and incentives to develop a more sustainable waste management
practice.
The aim, operational theory, practice and amount of landfill tax are very
variable and there are significant differences between various landfill taxes.
The general aim of landfill tax is to internalize the environmental costs of
landfill. Furthermore, in Denmark and the Netherlands landfill tax is part of the
green taxation system and contributes as an income to the replacement of other,
primarily employment-related taxes. In Austria and Switzerland the income is used
to the elimination of pollution caused by old, improperly built and operated landfills.
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Table 2 shows EU member states where landfill tax is applied by the ratio of
the tax. The highest tax on waste is imposed in the Netherlands. The tax can be
different based on the type of waste as in Italy or Great Britain or unified as for
instance in Sweden.
In Denmark and in (the non-EU member) Norway there is a tax imposed also
on burnt waste. In Austria the ratio is different depending on whether the burning
plant has a system to recover energy from landfill gas or not.
Table 2. Landfill tax rates in EU member states
Landfill tax ( /t) Member States
21 – 80
Denmark
The Netherlands
Sweden
5–20
Austria
Belgium
Finland
France
Great Britain
Italy
Not applied
Greece
Ireland
Luxemburg
Germany
Spain
Portugal
We have detailed experience about French, Austrian and British landfills based
on ECOTEC (2001) and OECD (2004) studies.
In France the tax was implemented in 1993 and the operator of the landfill
has to pay it after the quantity of household solid waste and mixed industrial waste
(deposable together with settlement waste). There is no landfill tax on recycled and
burnt waste.
There had been no calculation of externalities, planning or ex-ante analysis in
order to set the tax rate until 2002. When implementing the landfill tax the quantity
recycled was simply expected to increase with the increase of landfill cost. The tax
was 3.05 EUR/ton when it was introduced and as high as 9.15 EUR/ton in 1999.
It is 12–15% of landfill cost without taxation, that is, the tax results an increase of
landfill cost of about 12–15%.
As a result of the implementation of the tax the quantity of settlement waste did
not decrease but the volume of non-hazardous industrial waste started to decrease
slowly, as industry realized all waste prevention techniques with lower marginal
cost than the marginal cost increase caused by the tax. After the implementation of
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the tax in the following four years the quantity of landfilled waste decreased only by
4%. The reduction potential in case of settlement waste would have been low also
because in France relatively few settlements apply volume-based waste collection
fee system. It was another ‘adverse affect’ that the landfill tax became an element
of the unified emission tax system that enables the reduction of value added tax in
some cases. The common effect of landfill tax and reduced value added tax was
not investigated (ECOTEC, 2001).
In Great Britain landfill tax was implemented in the October of 1996. The tax
was determined based on the estimation of externalities of waste. The amount of
tax was 7 pounds (approximately 10.5 ) per ton at the beginning, by April, 1999
the tax was 10 pounds (16 ) and it was decided to increase it to 15 pounds (24 )
by 2004.
The effect of the tax was various in different regions because landfill fee is
very variable ranging from 8 to 20 pounds. It means that in some regions the cost of
landfill was doubled because of the tax. The main expectation was that as a result
of the implementation of tax, more waste would be disposed by burning as there
was no environmental tax imposed on that. The tax did not significantly reduce the
volume of waste because English households usually do not pay a volume-based
fee for waste collection and disposal.
Similarly to French experiences the implementation of landfill tax did not de-
crease the volume of settlement waste. The rate of recycling increased though from
quite a low starting point. The actual effect of the tax was the reduction of landfilled
industrial waste in Great Britain, too. The volume of landfilled construction and
demolition waste significantly decreased (ECOTEC, 2001; OECD, 2004).
In Austria the landfill tax (Altlastenbeitrag) was implemented in 1989 and it
is an important element of waste management regulation in spite of that in 1999
only 28.5% of solid household waste landed in landfills. The amount of tax ranged
from 7.2 /ton (demolish waste in ‘modern’ landfills) to 65 /ton (other waste in
‘unmodern’ landfill) and its average level is the double of the British tax for instance.
They did not investigate the effect of the higher waste fee because of the tax
on the volume of generated waste. What is sure is that in the decade of 1990s the
volume of waste decreased continuously. Within this the volume of solid settlement
waste decreased, recycling rate reached 50% and the share of burning rose from 6
to 16%. It is not clear, what was the role of landfill tax in the increase of utilization,
as other very effective measures were also applied to serve this aim (packaging
directive, biomass directive, landfill directive, awareness programmes). It seems
sure however, that the significant difference in tax rates for ‘modern’ and ‘unmodern’
landfills has contributed to the modernization of landfills. While in 1996/97 21
landfills did not satisfy the requirements of BAT, in 1999 there were only 4 such
landfills (ECOTEC, 2001).
Based on the experience of EU member states so far, we can state that:
Landfill taxes can be implemented relatively easily, they are general in EU
member-states. The basis of the tax can unambiguously be determined, transaction
costs are not high and environmental goal can clearly be demonstrated.
The most important effects of the tax are cost internalization (‘polluter pays
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principle’) and income generation. The amount of landfilled waste was not signif-
icantly reduced so the incentive function was not detected, especially not in states
where there is no volume-based waste collection fee system (as in case of France
and Great Britain). In those countries where the amount actually decreased, other
measures were also applied, so the effect of landfill tax is not clear (Austria).
The income generated by landfill tax is relatively stable (because of the low
incentive effect) therefore such an environmental fee can generate resources for
important and urgent state tasks in the short run, primarily for the elimination of past
pollutions, recultivation of wrongly built landfills and in the long run – presuming
that the planning of environmental expenditures will not be based on the ‘remainder
principle’ – it can be an element of an ecological tax reform package (that is the
reduction, replacement of other environmental taxes).
There was no significant macroeconomic effect registered in any state, that
is, non of the landfill taxes had any significant effect on the inflation, the number of
workplaces or the competitiveness of effected products.
3.2. The Operation Theory of Waste Disposal Tax
According to environmental economics the optimal rate of waste landfill or burning
tax equals marginal social external cost of landfill. If the tax is lower, the level of
waste generation will be higher than the social optimum. In the reverse case, the
volume of generated waste would decrease so much, that the cost of prevention
will be higher than the environmental damage would have been caused by more
waste. Both divergences from the optimum cause social inefficiency that is pose
extra burden on the society by avoidable environmental damages or too high cost
of pollution reduction technologies.
The two main elements of regulation planning are the determination of optimal
pollution (in our case: waste) emission and the selection of measures which this
optimum can be reached the most effectively with.
There has been no comprehensive analysis of waste management externali-
ties in Hungary so far, therefore we primarily use European data, surveys. In the
following table we summarize European waste externality estimates.
As the methodology of the Coopers&Lybrand/CSERGE (1997) survey was
obviously conservative, we will rather use the other two sources as the basis of our
calculations. The external cost of landfill is 9.5–20 /ton, while that of burning
is 43–77 /ton. Considering the difference between the EU average of national
income and Hungarian we estimated the external cost of landfill as high as 1450–
3000 HUF/ton and in case of burning we can calculate with 6500–11500 HUF/ton
external cost. The median in case of landfill is 2250 HUF/ton while in case of
burning 2500 HUF/ton, that is practically the same value is calculated.
So the optimal tax level is somewhere between 1500 and 2500 HUF/ton. This
result correlates well with the tax amounts applied in EU Member States that are
mostly between 5 and 20 /ton (that is 1300–1500 HUF/ton calculating with 260
HUF/EUR exchange rate).
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Table 3. External costs of waste management (EUR/t waste) (based on [10])
External costs
Technology
European
Commision
(2000)
SEDEE et al. [14] COOPERS et al. [3]
Burning with
energy recovery
−43–77 18
−24.8∗
14.6∗∗
Burning without
energy recovery
N.A. 30 N.A.
Landfill 11–20 9.5 4.4
∗ as a substitute for coal burning
∗∗ as a substitute for average power plant emission
An earlier research (KIS and JÁNOSKA, [10]) assessed the cost of waste
management alternatives in case of settlement solid wastes (see Fig. 2).
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Fig. 2. Marginal cost of waste management alternatives (KIS and JÁNOSKA, [10])
As we can see landfill is usually cheaper than burning and the recycling of
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paper, glass and metals is cheaper for certain quantities than the cost of landfill. This
observation is in harmony with the experience that paper, glass and metals were
utilized in some quantities (or would have been) even before any regulation. In the
figure there is the marginal cost of a modern landfill with additional environmental
technologies represented, and there were no such landfills built until the 1990s, that
is why it is more appropriate to use the conditional clause.
What happens after the implementation of landfill tax? Tax can be interpreted
as an additional cost of landfill – if it is imposed on landfills – it will shift the marginal
cost curve of landfill ‘upwards’. We illustrate the consequences in Fig. 3.
     Q1        Q2 
Landfilling after taxation 
Landfilling without taxation 
Recycling
Quantity 
Marginal 
Cost 
Fig. 3. Impacts of a landfill tax – Example One
In the case of our example the volume of utilization was Q1 before the im-
plementation of the tax, because the marginal cost of utilization was lower than
the marginal cost of landfill until this point. Landfill tax will increase the marginal
cost of landfill shift its marginal cost curve upwards (in the direction of the arrow).
Utilisation will increase from Q1 to Q2 as utilization will become cheaper than
landfill. Let us, however, realize that landfill tax will not motivate only utilization
or will not always be a good incentive.
In the case demonstrated in Fig. 4 in order to further increase utilization rate a
higher tax is imposed. The volume of utilization still will not increase to Q3 (where
the marginal cost of landfill equals the marginal cost of utilisation) because by
reaching Q2 burning will become cheaper than utilization. As the cost of landfill
will have ‘grown over’ the marginal cost of burning, burning will be cheaper in
general and therefore more preferred than landfill.
Fig. 5 draws our attention on the fact that fee does not similarly motivate the
utilization of different materials. In the case of those materials for which the mar-
ginal cost curve of utilization is flat (that is with the change of volume the marginal
cost of utilization slightly changes) the fee is more incentive (in case of material
B utilization will change from Q3 to Q4) than in the case of materials with steep
marginal cost curve (in case of material A utilization will change from1Q1 to Q2).
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Fig. 4. Impacts of a landfill tax – Example Two
Naturally we also have to take into consideration whether there were any other
instruments applied for instance the support of recycling. Fig. 6 illustrates this case.
In the case of this example, the state that implements the tax has already reg-
ulated waste utilization by specifying obligatory utilization rate for certain product
types.
Tax theoretically would modify the quantity recycled from Q1 to Q2. However
if Q3 was the norm earlier for waste generators, than there will be no effect of the
fee as the level of recycling will be Q3 both before and after the implementation
of the fee.
 Q1          Q2 Q3                   Q4
Landfilling after taxation 
Recycling
Material ’A’ 
Landfilling before taxation 
Quantity 
Marginal 
Cost 
Recycling
Material ’B’ 
Fig. 5. Impacts of a landfill tax – Example Three
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Landfill before taxation 
Landfill after taxation  
Q3  Q2  Q1  Quantity
Marginal 
Cost 
Recycling
Fig. 6. Impacts of landfill tex – Example Four
4. Conclusions
To sum up, we can state that a waste disposal tax (for landfill and burning) would
really rise the quantities recycled if
• it does not influence the relation of landfill and burning costs
• marginal cost curves of recycling are not too steep
• there is no regulation in force to set a relatively high rate of recycling.
We think that it is important that state intervention alone should not change
the rate of landfill and burning. We have concluded that the social cost of landfill
and burning is almost the same. If a tax would be imposed on landfill and not on
burning it would slightly increase the rate of burning. Consequent application of
the ‘polluter pays principle’ and the rationality of environmental economics make
us propose the implementation of a tax also on burning.
Unfortunately the case generally is that most marginal cost curves of recycling
are steep, moreover there are other regulatory measures in force in the European
Union and Hungary (e.g. product fees, the directive on packaging etc.). In these
circumstances it is understandable why landfill taxes implemented in some member-
states are so poorly or slightly incentive.
Taking into account the present elements of Hungarian regulation and the
costs of recycling we can assert that optimal tax rates (that is tax rates equal with
calculated external costs) would not motivate recycling in all cases. This is because
there is an obligatory recycling ratio for some product groups (e.g. packaging
waste). In the case of the combination of a minimal obligatory ratio of recycling
and product fee implemented in Hungary, product fee has lost its original incentive
function and it functions as a fine in case of not fulfilling the recycling regulation.
Although variable theoretical modellings and calculations show that the common
application of multiple regulatory measures results in optimal welfare outcome, our
practical experience shows that we cannot apply any combination.
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